

FREUD'S MAPS OF THE MIND

As a theoriser Freud was attracted to dualistic explanations; he divided problems into two opposing forces or two antagonistic terms. Conflict is at the centre of psychoanalytic thinking – the battle between conflicting conscious and unconscious desires causes the repression which leads to neurosis. Children both love and hate their parents – violent and erotic feelings often accompany each other in infancy. If these emotions are not satisfactorily resolved, these contending forces set the grounds for the adult's psychic difficulties, as we have seen in Freud's case histories. The simultaneous existence of opposing emotions and urges is a consistent theme of psychoanalytic theory (see the definition of ambivalence, p. 56).

During the latter part of the 1910s and the early 1920s Freud extensively revised and rethought psychoanalytic theory. He changed his ideas about what constituted the primary instinctual urges of humanity. Although his desire for dualistic explanations led him to attempt to simplify the number of terms he worked with, he often found himself adding yet another term to his dualistic concepts instead. In this chapter I will cover the question of these shifting psychoanalytic maps of the mind, and the terminology which Freud used in his attempt to create a totalising explanation of human psychic life. I will focus on two main interrelated Freudian templates: that of the instincts, and that of the structure of the mental apparatus which

Freud divided into those well-known but often misunderstood terms ego, id and super-ego. The word 'instinct' is the English translation of the German word *Trieb* that is used in the Standard Edition of Freud's works. However the word 'drive' is used more frequently nowadays to translate *Trieb*, in order to distinguish Freud's idea of instincts from the instincts of animals. Throughout this chapter I use drive and instinct interchangeably.

Before I begin my exploration of these two schemas, however, I want to call attention to one interesting paradox about Freud's desires to map the mind. In attempting to systematise and categorise sexuality and its accompanying energies, Freud often appears to install a set of universal rules – a scientific explanation for the workings of human sexuality. However, to do so, he and other nineteenth-century sexologists consistently borrow names from literature – there is the Oedipus complex, named after Oedipus Rex; Narcissism named after the mythical figure Narcissus; masochism named after the punishment-loving Sacher-Masoch, author of the erotic novel *Venus in Furs*; and sadism named after the French philosopher of the bedroom, the Marquis de Sade. Literary stories seem like unlikely places to look to extract a scientific explanation or system. Literature is stereotypically seen as the opposite of science – more interested in fantasy than truth, and untrammelled by a need for accuracy. The fact that Freud often finds the inspirations for his theories of sex and the mind in the realm of literature should alert us to the ways in which the two studies can reciprocally affect each other, even when we approach the more 'scientific' Freud (Felman 1977a: 9).

NARCISSISM, EGO AND ID

Narcissism was a term originally used by Freud to describe the sexual attitude in which a person directs his love towards himself, rather than towards another. Narcissus was a Greek mythological figure who fell in love with his own reflection in a pool of water and became rooted to the spot, staring at his own image, until he eventually found himself turned into a flower for his trouble. Narcissism, like many of Freud's terms that began their lives referring to perversions or pathologies, eventually extended its meaning, as Freud recognised that love of oneself and erotic interest in one's own body was in fact a normal and healthy stage of individual development. By no means all self-love can

be considered pathological: indeed, a degree of self-love is necessary for everyone. The phase of infantile narcissism, in which the child takes himself as a sexual object and bestows his love on himself, is an extension of the even earlier period when the child could not distinguish between himself and the outside world, when he could not tell where the breast ended and he began. As the child grows up he discovers the sexual correlate of this infantile self-love – the auto-erotic satisfaction of masturbation.

When Freud begins thinking about the importance of narcissism he complicates a model he has developed of the **instincts**.

INSTINCTS

Instincts are energetic, bodily drives to certain kinds of action. All instincts originally have biological sources – the aim of every instinct is satisfaction, which it attempts to find in objects – the people, things, body parts, etc. one looks towards to satisfy erotic desires.

Until he postulates the existence of narcissism Freud has assumed that there are two separate sets of instincts which guide all human activities: instincts of self-preservation (connected to the **ego**) and sexual instincts (connected to the **libido** or id). his ideas about the ego and the id change over the course of his many explorations of the topic, and they change in relation to each other (see Freud 1923). For clarity's sake, I will stick to a few basic definitions.

The ego, id and super-ego are topographical concepts of Freud's – meaning that they exist 'within' the mind, but that their existence could never be marked out on specific parts of the brain. (For a definition of the super-ego see p. 48) Topography refers to mapping. Freud's maps of the mind are, in a sense, imaginary; they cannot be traced out on the material of the body or the brain. Rather, Freud's topographies perform the service of helping us understand the way these areas of the psyche work together and relate to each other.

EGO AND ID

When the child is first born it is a mass of **id**, an amorphous unstructured set of desires; the demand 'I want' is the sum total of its mind's contents. Out of these primal desires an ego quickly begins to emerge. One definition of **ego** is the individual's image of himself as a self-conscious being, his sense of himself as separate from the world which surrounds him. Another psychoanalytic definition of ego is that which is conscious in the person, that which experiences and senses the outside world and which represents reality to the self. These two meanings are related but not identical – the first meaning of ego is more encompassing: it implies a whole self, rather than a self which is split into separate, warring factions, the ego and the id, that the other meaning implies.

The id is inseparable from the unconscious – id wants and desires in the here and now, it doesn't make plans for the future. Freud often claims that the unconscious (which is the same as the id) knows no time but the present, no answer but Yes. The ego, on the other hand, recognises time and the setbacks which go along with living in a world where one has to wait. The ego preserves the self by telling it to hold back on its desires and negotiate with reality. The id and the ego roughly line up with two separate sets of instincts – the id correlates to the instinct for pleasure – which Freud also calls Eros, the Greek word for love. (We will have more to say about pleasure in the next section of this chapter on the pleasure principle). The ego correlates to the instinct to protect oneself, the instinct of self-preservation.

Freud initially posits these two instincts as separate from each other and as fulfilling two different functions in the psyche. The id says 'I want', and the ego tells it to wait; the id says 'Go for it', and the ego says 'Protect and preserve yourself – survival is more important than instant gratification'. Narcissism, however, appears to bring together these two sets of instincts – if you have enough self-love you will certainly do a good job at preserving yourself. You will be your own primary object of concern as well as erotic investment – your main motivating force will be to keep your love object alive, which is, of course, you. This picture makes it clear how the two apparently warring impulses of sexuality and self-preservation can actually meet and merge.

In the usual course of events, Freud believed, narcissism was a phase of development; eventually a person would transfer his love for himself to another object. (As the Oedipus complex indicates, this love would usually come to rest on one of the parents.) However if a person never transfers his self-love to another, original healthy narcissism can lead to severe psychic distress along the lines of psychosis. A delusional sense of one's own importance, schizophrenia, hallucinations and a paranoid feeling of always being watched are all symptoms of narcissistic psychotic disorders. In the severest narcissistic states the patient finds it impossible to engage with other human beings at all; he has no sense that anyone can exist outside of his own mind.

Now, if we think back to the importance of transference as a key element of the psychoanalytic cure, we find that the self-absorption of narcissism disturbs the way it works. Transference depends upon a patient's ability to interact with, and have emotional reactions to, others. If you've never hated or loved your father or mother, you won't be able to put your analyst in your parents' place and work out your reactions to them. A complete victim of a narcissistic psychosis could not develop any relationship to the analyst at all, thus making analysis impossible. Successful analysis requires that one should always react emotionally to the analyst as well as to one's own past. The severest version of narcissism locks a person into a private world. If the one who loves and the love object are one and the same person, there is no other, nor even an image of another – no one to bounce love or hate off.

In practical terms, Freud found that those suffering from severe forms of narcissistic illness were difficult if not impossible to treat, because they could not engage in transference. Furthermore, Freud's theories about narcissism also created a problem for his belief in the separation of the ego and the id. The ego was supposedly split off from sexuality – it covered the domain of non-sexual motivations. But the theory of narcissism destroyed this separation by making the sexual object and the I (the ego) who thought and acted one and the same. The force which worked to preserve the self and the force which created desire became indistinguishable from one another. The consequence of this train of thought of Freud's was that all motivations might be considered sexual.

Freud's critics, both in his own time and recently, have often accused him of being a pan-sexualist – meaning that he believed that all

human motivations were finally sexual in nature. To try and counter this mistaken assumption, I argued earlier in the book that Freud's theories are as much about interpretation as they are about sex. We products of the twentieth (and twenty-first) century have often adopted this pan-sexual Freud as the one we know best, and feel most comfortable ridiculing – the sex-obsessed old man who finds phallic symbols everywhere he looks. But there was a time when Freud himself was worried that his conclusions were tending in that direction. At the time that he was working on his instinctual theories he realised that narcissism created a quandary. The theoretical consequences of narcissism made it clear that it was impossible to completely separate the sexual instincts from the ego instincts. Was it that every human motivation was sexual after all?

Freud found a way out of this impasse by renegotiating his categories of the psyche. He suggested that there might be a violent, aggressive and self-destructive element to human nature which could not be explained in the terms he had been using. In the next section of this chapter we will look at another way in which Freud thought about his categories of the ego and the id, through the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Into this new dualism another third term must fall – that is Freud's strange and haunting creation, the death drive.

PLEASURE, REALITY, DEATH

Psychoanalysis is rarely a theory of compromise – you find love and hate together, but they never combine to indifference. Hot and cold stay hot and cold together; they do not make lukewarm water. Yet Freud also knows that, although the psyche is never particularly happy about it, there are moments when compromises must be effected in order for us to survive in the world. Freud's early theory of the instincts illustrates one of these compromises. Freud's instinctual theory initially suggested that there are two sets of instincts – an instinct towards pleasure and an instinct towards self-preservation – which work together despite their opposite aims.

Freud uses an economic model of tension and release to describe pleasure. He thinks of pleasure in terms of the most basic kinds of living organisms – ones made up of one or few cells – with the most basic kind of feelings (if you can even call them feelings at that level of existence). He postulates that an organism, at its simplest, consists of

an inside and an outside – the inside of the organism functions to keep it together as an organism by mastering the stimuli which affect it from the outside. A build-up of tension, in the form of stimuli from the outside, which is unmasterable by the inside is unpleasurable. In this particular model it is in the release of tension that pleasure lies.

The human nervous system is one model that puts this dynamic in place. Freud postulates in his article ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ (1915) that ‘the nervous system is an apparatus which has the function of getting rid of the stimuli that reach it, or of reducing them to the lowest possible level’ (Freud 1915b: 116). Freud calls this instinctive desire not to be ruffled or bothered, the principle of constancy. He also discusses this principle in relation to dreams in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Chapter 7, sections C and E. One of the functions of the dream, and the dream’s hallucinatory fulfilling of wishes, is to keep the dreamer happily dreaming and ergo asleep. This particular aspect of Freud’s theory can be understood to mean that what we all want most is to keep on sleeping, something which any student could have told him.

Later Freud admits that not all forms of tension are unpleasurable. The build-up towards sexual release may be seen as a form of pleasurable tension. Yet, as Freud imagines sexuality, the release of tension always needs to happen for the pleasure to really take place. The awkwardness of this model for measuring happiness and unhappiness lies in the fact that Freud is taking a quantitative or economic idea (tension/release) and mapping it onto a qualitative world – humans feel all sorts of complicated and mixed emotions, as psychoanalytic theory is quick to point out. Yet, although it may look initially unconvincing, following Freud through his economic theories of the tension and release of the pleasure principle leads down some interesting paths and towards some provocative conclusions.

The pleasure principle is aligned with the libido – the drive towards happiness, wish-fulfilment, the release of sexual energy. What is it then that counters pleasure for Freud in the human condition? Why are we not all only seeking pleasure all the time? There are a number of different ways of answering this question. First, not all pleasures or wishes can be satisfied as soon as they are conceived. The infant, if you remember, begins by believing that it lives in a world where its wishes are instantly gratified – where there is no distinction between what goes on its own mind and what the world offers up to it. But this

illusion is quickly shattered. In point of fact, the mother with the breast is not always there to feed it and put it into a state of infantile bliss. The world does not always satisfy its desires. This state of frustration of expectation, this confrontation with the outer circumstances which have the power to ruin our imagined joy, Freud calls the reality principle. The infant eventually comes to realise that it must negotiate with this outside world in order for its wishes to be granted. It may be possible to achieve pleasure, but the best way of guaranteeing this may not be to insist that pleasure happens immediately; the baby might have to delay pleasure in order eventually to experience it. We are willing to give up the promise of instant gratification if we think our wishes might come true if we wait. These kinds of deals are made in different ways by everybody every day. If we delay our pleasure and go to work, we get paid, and we can count on having more pleasure (or at least more money with which to purchase pleasure) at the weekend. In Chapter 6 we will see that Freud uses this model of the duelling pleasure and reality principles to explain the repressive contract which forms our sense of civilised society.

In 1920 Freud confronts another set of problems around the economic theories he has been postulating. Up until this point Freud has assumed that everyone's ultimate goal is pleasure; if you get diverted from pleasure in the short run by the reality principle, it is really because pleasure is simply being deferred. Even if consciousness admits the possibility of unpleasure, the unconscious is always instinctively turned towards pleasure in every form. Yet as far back as *The Interpretation of Dreams*, however, Freud, found himself confronted with some dreams which seemed particularly unpleasurable, which did not seem to be fulfilling wishes. Often these dreams were repeated – nightmares which happened over and over again. One particularly timely example was that of soldiers suffering from shell-shock from the First World War who repeatedly dreamt about being blown up. The traumatic dreams of shell-shocked patients' seemed to put Freud's theory of the pleasure principle in jeopardy. Where is the pleasure in returning unconsciously to a terrible and upsetting situation? Why do we repeat that which we could not stand to experience originally?

Repetition becomes a new and disturbing element in Freud's theories in the 1920s, although there is also a sense in which repetition was always a factor in both the neurosis and the psychoanalytic cure. If neurotic illnesses are rooted in events, memories and fantasies of child-

hood which were never properly understood at the time, the reason that people cannot leave behind these memories is because they are still living through and with them. Neurotics repeat and replay their pasts – they can't escape from them. Even when they translate them into the bodily symptom of hysteria it is still in the form of a repetition, although it is a repetition that they unconsciously hide from themselves by disguising it.

There is another sense also in which the psychoanalytic cure owes a debt to repetition as a process. The cure involves returning psychically to an upsetting situation, back to the scene of a crime, as it were. The analyst leads the patient back through their memories towards the initial upsetting moment, scene or fantasy, but not so that the patient can blindly repeat the experience of the initial trauma, feeling the same unmasterable emotions. Rather, the analyst helps the patient to repeat the experience in order to understand it. Instead of blind repetition, we have repetition with a difference: the ability to analyse and see the source of the difficulty. Freud calls this process working through, in contrast to simple repetition (see the discussion of 'Remembering, Repeating and Working Through' in the final chapter, p. 122).

So we see that repetition is a strategy that can work both for and against psychic health. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* Freud muses on the contradictory uses of repetition. He finds himself watching a one-and-a-half-year-old child (in reality his grandson, Ernst) playing a game which Freud calls 'fort/da' (or 'gone/there'). The child repeatedly throws away a spool of string and then brings it back to himself, yelling his baby version of 'fort' and 'da' as he does so ('fort' becomes 'o-o-o-o'). Freud interprets this game as the child's re-enacting in play the painful event of his mother's periodic leaving. When the baby triumphantly brings her back ('da!') or flings her away ('fort!') he can pretend he is in control of his mother's movements, instead of her making decisions without reference to him. The 'fort/da' game, like the psychoanalytic cure itself, involves playing at repetition in order to master a painful situation.

Freud postulates, therefore, that there might be uses for repetition, in that it can help us cope with new, unpleasant or apparently unmasterable data. Repetition turns each new situation into an old one, which we may have already experienced and so know how to handle. But Freud was not completely satisfied with his own explanations. He also postulates a compulsion to repeat which has no such obvious

psychic use. He noticed that his grandson seemed to throw the spool away more often than he brought it back, although, as Freud points out, bringing it back, staging the mother's return, would involve more of the compensation of pleasure. Freud felt similarly frustrated by the repetitive dreams of shell-shocked soldiers which seemed to replay their near-death experiences without actually helping them to master the situation – without making them in any sense healthier because of those dreams. He felt that something was missing from his ideas. Was it possible that repetition could be a psychic end in itself? Something that went against what human beings want, either consciously or unconsciously?

In a controversial formulation, Freud came up with what he called the **death drive** to try and explain these diversions from the pleasure principle which were not meant to delay pleasure to conform to the needs of reality.

THE DEATH DRIVE

Contrary to what its name implies, the death drive is not connected with aggressive impulses towards others. It is self-destructive, rather than other-destructive, and it seems to have no economic explanation in Freud's own terms. There is no payback of pleasure involved in the death drive.

Freudian analysts have often ignored the death instinct – or Thanatos as it also known, in contrast to Eros (the pleasure principle). But *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, where the death drive is explained, has been picked up by literary theorists as a compelling text, chiefly for the ways in which Freud connects the idea of repetition to death. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle's* metaphysical formulations, death and pleasure do finally come to be associated. Death is the ultimate release of tension; it promises the ultimate experience of stasis and complete calm. Re-enacting unpleasurable experiences comes to seem like a rehearsal for our own deaths.

But although our own deaths may be a goal of the self-destructive urge, in reality the deaths we experience are never our own – they are the deaths of family members, friends, loved ones which we must

negotiate. In psychoanalytic practice, the death drive is not usually seen as a very useful economic concept of Freud's. Rather, another theory of death and loss seems more relevant to how we actually experience the deaths of others. One of Freud's most interesting economic concepts centres around the ways in which it becomes possible, or remains impossible, to 'work through' the deaths of people we love.

FILLING UP, EMPTYING OUT: 'MOURNING AND MELANCHOLIA' (1917)

Psychoanalytic theory can be seen as made up of successive stories of loss. In Sophocles' play, Oedipus Rex loses his sense of mastery, his kingdom, even his eyes, when he discovers he's been acting out a fate over which he had no control. Freud interprets the play as a rehearsal of another originary loss – the moment when the boy child recognises that he has lost the mother as a love object and must give up on his love for her to submit to the threatening figure of the father. The punishing father, via the castration complex, threatens him with another loss – that of his penis. The little girl, discovering sexual difference, according to Freud goes through a different series of formative events but they also involve loss and disappointment – she discovers that she is missing something that boys have, and that her mother is missing it too. According to Freud, she turns away from loving her mother in disgust, because her mother cannot give her a penis, and she turns towards the father because she hopes the father can give her, if not a penis, then a penis substitute – a baby. In the stories that psychoanalysis tells about sexual development, young children are always reacting to losses, real or imaginary: the loss of the illusion that your needs and wishes will be fulfilled as soon as you have them, the loss of the comforting maternal sense of security symbolised by the breast, the loss of the penis via the threat of castration, or the sense for the little girl that that loss has already taken place.

So psychoanalysis suggests that we are constantly reacting to different kinds of real and imagined losses, but how do these losses relate to the loss of a real person that happens with death? In his article 'Mourning and Melancholia' Freud analyses the ways in which people react to the death of a loved one, or the loss of a cherished idea: 'mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as

one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so on' (Freud 1917: 251–2). A normal state of mourning may involve a period of serious distress and depression, but should heal itself in time. Melancholia is the pathological version of mourning. Symptoms of melancholia include 'a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment' (*Ibid.*: 252). As Freud points out, the melancholic resembles the normal mourner in everything but their self-hatred.

Mourning may be a painful process that might include psychic denials of the loss of the loved object – dreams or fantasies in which they still live. But, Freud claims, 'Normally, respect for reality gains the day' (*Ibid.*: 253). Over time the reality of the object's loss is accepted, and the object's place in the psychic make-up of the mourner is diminished. The normal mourner eventually begins to lose the feeling that they are carrying around the weight of a great loss. Their own ego can emerge: 'when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again' (*Ibid.*: 253).

Melancholia, however, invokes another psychic process, and one more difficult to negotiate. What Freud found was that melancholics harboured unconscious ambivalent feelings towards the lost object. The death of a simultaneously loved and hated parent, or being thrown over by a cruel but admired lover can result in a severe state of melancholia. Melancholics manifest this loss by displaying self-hatred. Freud makes an important distinction: 'In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself' (*Ibid.*: 254). The loss is taken on to the self – it is as if a part of the self has died along with the person to whom that part of the self was attached. But why does this happen? Freud claims that the self-reproaches of melancholics are really disguised reproaches directed towards the loved person or object. This loathing of the self is a way for melancholics to unconsciously protect themselves from the feelings of guilt that would surely follow if they were consciously to admit their ambivalence towards the lost object. Instead of expressing these difficult feelings, melancholics identify with the lost object, and may even appear to become that other person by taking on their traits. For instance, a daughter who feels guilt at the death of a mother she

secretly disliked could begin to take on characteristics of her mother, or do the things she used to do. Melancholics feel responsible for the death of the object; they feel they have psychically murdered the other person. Taking on the other's traits is a way of repairing this loss in fantasy by bringing the other back to life.

In other words, melancholics cannot admit the reality of the ambivalently loved and hated object's death because they are afraid that they were responsible for the murder. Freud imagines this process of melancholic resurrecting of the object in cannibalistic terms. The extreme identification which follows the loss is called introjection; the ego metaphorically devours the lost object, becoming it by taking it into itself. The cure for melancholia involves the conscious recognition and acceptance of the hostile feelings towards the object. When the melancholic finally admits these feelings he can stop hating himself, and loosen the stranglehold that the dead other seems to hold over him. The economic theory of 'Mourning and Melancholia' suggests a world where people are literally filled up or taken over by the past. The melancholic introjects the psyche of the other and unconsciously attempts to live out his life as that other person in order to make up for the damage that he imagines having done to the object. As a theory, melancholia resembles a ghost story, in which the ghost of the dead past actually invades the self. In Freud's theories loss may be rampant, but those who are lost often return to haunt their survivors.

SUPER-EGO

The melancholic's feverish self-hatred springs from the feeling that we commonly label guilt. Guilt is another crucial element in Freud's theories; it is the key to the term which follows the ego and the id, the super-ego (see initial definition, p. 48). The super-ego is the self-critical aspect of the ego; that which judges the conscious and unconscious decisions of the id and the ego. It develops from the ego in its continued attempts to negotiate with reality. The super-ego measures the real ego of a person against an ego ideal – an ideal image of the self that is based on the earliest narcissistic self-love, before a recognition of any flaws in the self. The super-ego is allied with the sense of conscience; it holds the self up to high moral and social standards which the libido wishes to deny. For the super-ego, the individual lives as part of a community, responding and responsible to

others. For the id, the individual lives only for himself and what he or she can get. But all three of Freud's structural concepts, the ego, id and super-ego, function in response to each other.

Paranoid patients who think they are constantly being watched, or believe that someone is reading their thoughts may suffer from delusions. Yet, Freud claims, these delusions also reflect the real state of psychic affairs: 'This complaint is justified; it describes the truth. A power of this kind, watching, discovering and criticising all our intentions, does really exist. Indeed, it exists in every one of us in normal life' (Freud 1914b: 90). The sense of guilt and fear that emerges from the super-ego's surveillance of the subject originates, like so much in Freud, with the relationship to the parents: 'Originally this sense of guilt was a fear of punishment by the parents, or, more correctly, the fear of losing their love; later the parents are replaced by an indefinite number of fellow-men' (*Ibid.*: 97). The super-ego leads the way from individual psychology to group psychology, emphasising the individual's need to insert him or herself into the demands of a community. And that community is usually first represented by the judging and punishing eyes of the parents.

SUMMARY

As we have seen, Freud postulates more than one topography of the mind. Sometimes he arranges the psyche according to the relations between the ego, libido and super-ego. Sometimes he employs the concepts of the pleasure principle, the reality principle and the death drive. But the wars that rage in each individual's inner psychic apparatus (and the compromises which are made there) inevitably involve a struggle between the urge to immediately fulfil desires and the recognition that this is not always possible. Freud's terminology should always be used with caution, recognising that each of his several mappings of the mind is primarily metaphorical – done in the service of attempting to visualise distinctions which are not located in different areas of the body. These distinctions hold up and break down according to the relations between agencies, as we saw in the way in which the concept of narcissism collapses the pleasure principle and the self-preservative instincts. The super-ego is another one of Freud's third terms which serves to complicate the rela-

tionship between the ego and the id. In the next section, on Freud and the social, we will see how Freud's super-ego negotiates with the larger outside world while it continues to represent the harsh voice of conscience as springing from the introjected voice of the parents. When psychoanalysis moves from theorising about the individual to theorising about the social it never leaves the family far behind.

Copyright of Sigmund Freud (0415215218) is the property of Routledge. The copyright in an individual article may be maintained by the author in certain cases. Content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.