Thesis: The United States made a grave error in its 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Summary: This article presents an argument against the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The U.S. made a grave error in its 2003 invasion of Iraq. It has launched a violent occupation of a sovereign nation against world public opinion on the flimsiest of excuses. The claims of the U.S. government regarding the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his arsenal are less convincing if the historical record is taken into account. Also, an understanding of the pattern of U.S. relations with Iraq, and their previous support for Hussein, may help explain the flaws in current policy. The U.S. government helped Saddam Hussein's socialist Baath Party seize power in Iraq during the 1960s, seeing a promising potential ally in the Middle East. During the ten years of the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. re-established official diplomatic relations with Iraq, and provided the country with multi-million dollar loans as well as intelligence on Iranian military targets. Prior to the 2003 invasion, the U.S. had invented a number of reasons to justify its war against Iraq. These had been created and discarded by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush as deemed necessary, leaving a confusing trail of conflicting stories. In attempting to justify its war, the U.S. claimed that it sought to end Hussein's dictatorship in order to establish democracy in Iraq. The U.S. government is making the decisions the Iraqi people need to make for themselves regarding the future of their political and economic institutions. The American presence in Iraq will only serve to further destabilize the region and create a violent backlash against U.S. military intervention and occupation.

The United States made a grave error in its 2003 invasion of Iraq. It has launched a violent occupation of a sovereign nation against world public opinion on the flimsiest of excuses. It has opened the door for other nations to justify military action and occupation based on the doctrine of pre-emptive attack.

The claims of the U.S. government regarding the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his arsenal are less convincing if the historical record is taken into account. Also, an understanding of the pattern of U.S. relations with Iraq, and our previous support for Hussein, may help explain the flaws in current policy.

The United States government helped Saddam Hussein's socialist Baath Party seize power in Iraq during the 1960s, seeing a promising potential ally in the Middle East. As it had done in other countries, the U.S. influenced political conditions in Iraq in an attempt to further American goals in the oil-rich nation. To this end, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supplied information about leftists and intellectuals to the Baathists as a way to help the party consolidate its power and weaken opposition in Iraq. As a result of this policy, hundreds of the party's opponents were executed at the hands of Hussein and other Baath Party members.

In 1983 and 1984, Donald Rumsfeld visited Saddam Hussein to solidify U.S. ties to Iraq. Rumsfeld assured Hussein that the U.S. would continue its support in spite of Iraq's well known use of chemical weapons against its military opponent, Iran. Even though Iraq had initiated a war against Iran in 1980, and Hussein had viciously attacked Iraq's own Kurdish population in 1975, the U.S. removed Iraq from its list of terrorist states in 1982.

Rumsfeld's visits were part of the U.S. strategy of reinforcing ties with Iraq during the war against Iran. The U.S. had decided early on that it preferred an Iraqi victory in this war, hoping to weaken the Shiite revolution that had taken place in Iran in 1979 (the Iranian revolution was itself a reaction against U.S. support for the highly unpopular Shah of Iran).

During the ten years of the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. re-established official diplomatic relations with Iraq, and provided the country with multi-million dollar loans as well as intelligence on Iranian military targets. Recently declassified documents on Rumsfeld's 1984 trip to Baghdad reveal he had been instructed to downplay U.S. concern over Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Although the U.S. had made public statements disapproving of these war crimes, Rumsfeld privately told Hussein that it would not affect American support for his regime.

Iran demanded a United Nations Security Council condemnation of Iraq's chemical weapon use; however, the U.S. delegate to the UN was successful in weakening the accusation against Iraq.

In 1988, Hussein launched a chemical weapon attack against Iraqi Kurds at the village of Halabja. An estimated 5,000 civilians are believed to have died as a result of this attack. In response, the U.S. Senate proposed sanctions against Iraq. However, the White House downplayed the consequences of this proposal, once again protecting its ally Saddam Hussein.

Throughout Iraq's war with Iran, the United States government ignored the well-documented crimes of the Hussein regime. At the same time, the U.S. in effect rewarded Hussein by raising the level of financial aid to Iraq, and continuing U.S. exports of technology and materials that could be used for military purposes.

Prior to the 2003 invasion, the U.S. had invented a number of reasons to justify its war against Iraq. These had been created and discarded by the Bush administration as deemed necessary, leaving a confusing trail of conflicting stories. Different justifications were used: the immediate threat Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, a connection between Hussein and Al Qaeda, the liberation of the Iraqi people. Months later, none of these allegations have been proven valid.

Weapons inspectors have been monitoring Iraq's arsenal for over a decade. This inspection program was established after the first Gulf War, and was considered quite successful by many of those involved in the inspection process. Inspectors eventually gained more detailed knowledge of Iraq's arsenal than any government could hope to obtain. Nonetheless, the White House described many threatening scenarios regarding weapons the inspectors had supposedly failed to find. However, even after the invasion, none of these weapons turned up.

Hussein was at his strongest and most dangerous during the 1980s, when the U.S. was giving him critical economic, diplomatic and military support. Hussein committed his gravest crimes at the time of our strongest support for his regime. These same criminal acts were later used to justify our invasion, with the important historical context (that Hussein was our ally) omitted.

Prior to the U.S. invasion, the Bush administration attempted to tie Hussein to Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist network. However, there was never any evidence to support any claim of a connection between the two. Hussein, as the leader of a secular government, is fundamentally at odds with the religious beliefs of Bin Laden and his followers.

None of the hijackers involved in the September 2001 terrorist attacks were Iraqi or had contacts to the Iraqi government. In fact, almost all the hijackers were from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of which are important U.S. allies.

In attempting to justify its war, the U.S. claimed that it sought to end Hussein's dictatorship in order to establish democracy in Iraq. However, such a claim raises many questions: for example, why is the liberation of the Iraqi people important to the U.S. now, when it was not important ten or fifteen years ago? The U.S. government supported the undemocratic advancement of the Baath Party through a series of coups and assassinations. In doing so, the U.S. enabled decades of totalitarian rule at the expense of Hussein's immediate neighbors and his own population.

The United States' record of involvement in Iraq, and elsewhere in the Middle East, makes it hard to believe that the Bush administration was interested in the welfare of Iraqis when it launched its invasion. During the first Gulf War, the U.S. deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure in Iraq, such as water sources, sanitation systems and roadways. These non-military targets are forbidden by international law. In the aftermath of the 1991 war, illnesses and deaths from water-borne diseases skyrocketed among the Iraqi population, especially children.

After the Gulf War, the U.S. imposed trade sanctions against Iraq that were directly responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians, according to the United Nations. Because of the sanitation problems, the spread of disease grew out of control, and at the same time, sanctions made the medicines needed to treat such diseases unavailable to the Iraqis.

The current Bush administration has expressed concern for bringing democracy to Iraqis. However, such an assertion is questionable in light of our long-standing indifference to or support of regimes that equal or exceed the anti-democratic nature of the Baath party. For example, Saudi Arabia is a dictatorship and has documented ties to the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Pakistan is a similar dictatorship and has well documented ties to both Al Qaeda and the remains of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Turkey has a long record of terrorizing its Kurdish population although the U.S. has always turned a blind eye to this oppression (as it once did for Hussein).

It is doubtful the U.S. will allow a true democracy to flourish for the Iraqi people for several reasons: the Iraqis would most likely choose to eliminate the U.S. military bases now being set up in Iraq, and likewise vote U.S. corporations out of Iraq. A strong nationalist sentiment exists in Iraq, and its citizens will not tolerate a high degree of U.S. military and corporate control. In addition, the Shiite majority (60 percent) of Iraq could form bonds with its Shiite neighbor Iran, if Shiite interests are allowed democratic representation within Iraq. The U.S. does not want an alliance between these two countries.

The justifications for war offered by the Bush administration do not hold up to scrutiny. However, well documented U.S. motives and strategies regarding Iraq and the Middle East support other more probable justifications. Evidence suggests that a primary reason for the U.S. government's decision to invade Iraq is that country's possession of the second largest oil reserves in the Middle East.

The U.S. has a long history of trying to control oil resources in the Middle East and around the world. Internal documents from the immediate post-World War II period describe the Middle East as being of primary geopolitical importance to the United States. This appraisal was based on the region's significant oil reserves, and the importance of the control of energy resources in military and economic affairs.

The current instability in Iraq is a reflection of the policies that advocated war rather than diplomacy. The U.S. military has no popular support among the Iraqi people, and many view it as an occupying force. Although many Iraqis are happy to see Hussein deposed, they are hesitant to replace one undemocratic leadership with another.

The U.S. government continues to become involved in decisions the Iraqi people need to make for themselves regarding the future of their political and economic institutions. The American presence in Iraq will only serve to further destabilize the region and create a violent backlash against U.S. military intervention and occupation.

1. How convincing is the author's argument that U.S. actions in Iraq open the door for "other nations to justify military action and occupation based on the doctrine of pre-emptive attack"? Why?
2. According to the author, what role did U.S. policy during the Iran/Iraq War play in setting the stage for future conflicts between the U.S. and Iraq?
3. According to the author, how did U.S. actions during and after the first Gulf War help lead to a second war? Explain.
4. Is it valid to argue that because U.S. policy aided Saddam Hussein's rise to power that U.S. policy to remove him was misguided? Discuss.
5. In your opinion, if the U.S. had attacked Iraq because it had the second largest oil reserves in the Middle East, as the author suggests, would it have been a justifiable protection of U.S. interests? Discuss.

Books

Cooley, John K. Unholy Wars. London: Pluto Press, 2000.

Kessler, Ronald. Inside the CIA. New York: Pocket Books, 1992.

Pilger, John. Hidden Agendas. London: Vintage Books, 1998.

Woodward, Bob. Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987. London: Headline Books, 1987.

Periodicals

Asquith, Christina. "Turning the Page on Iraq's History." Christian Science Monitor 95.238 (4 November 2003): 3p. Online. EBSCO. 2 January 2004.

Klein, Naomi. "Bring Halliburton Home." Nation 277.17 (24 November 2003): 3p. Online. EBSCO. 2 January 2004.

LaFranchi, Howard. "Hussein's Fall Sends Ripple Through Middle East." Christian Science Monitor 96.19 (22 December 2003): 3p. Online. EBSCO. 2 January 2004.

Peterson, Scott. "Afghanistan's Lessons for Iraq." Christian Science Monitor 95.249 (20 November 2003): 2p. Online. EBSCO. 2 January 2004.

Tyson, Ann Scott. "Media Caught in Iraq's War of Perceptions." Christian Science Monitor 95.247 (18 November 2003): 3p. Online. EBSCO. 2 January 2004.

• These essays and any opinions, information or representations contained therein are the creation of the particular author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of EBSCO Publishing.

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By Tim Anderson